what’s on every unit, down to the part.

a live map of every unit in the field. each hardware lot, supplier and part revision, joined to the exact software version running on it, over time. none of it self-reported: a ci step boot-tests every release on real silicon before it ships, and the agent proves who it is before the unit is trusted.

ship signed. put it back in one move.

every release is sbom’d, cosigned and tuf-published, then staged across the fleet in rings. a ring that misses its health gate stops the rollout and reverts every unit it already touched. repairs move the same way: typed, reversible, gated, undone automatically if they didn’t help. the llm never touches the actuation path.

which part. which lot. which config.

a full bank of detectors (envelope, anomaly, degradation, change-point, peer-outlier, log, data-drift) judged against three baselines: spec, self, peer. then an abductive loop turns ml models into discriminating instruments over the unit’s causal graph, tries to kill its own leading hypothesis, and lands somewhere you can act: replace a part, or change a config.

the receipt falls out of the work.

the signed exhaust of normal operation (ci provenance, sboms, attested deploy and rollback records) becomes oscal, cmmc and cato evidence on its own, anchored to a tamper-evident log. there is nothing extra to write down, because the evidence is a by-product of doing the job.